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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS
POSITION THAT DENIAL OF COUNSEL IN NON-
CAPITAL CASE MAY CONSTITUTE DEPRIVA-
TION OF DUE PROCESS
Petitioner, an eighteen year old defendant who had had only a sixth
grade education was, with his two co-defendants, indicted and charged
with robbery. Before trial, petitioner requested the court to appoint an
attorney for him since he was financially unable to retain counsel. The
court denied the motion and stated: "[T]he Court will try to see that
your rights are protected throughout the case."' All co-defendants there-
upon pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. During the ex-
amination of the first witness, the counsel who was representing one of
the defendants offered to represent all defendants as long as their in-
terests did not conflict. At the conclusion of the state's evidence, counsel
moved to have the case dismissed and upon denial of this motion, tendered
on behalf of his original client and in the presence of the jury, a plea of
guilty to petit larceny. This plea was accepted and the trial proceeded.
Petitioner was convicted of robbery from the person, and the sentence
imposed was from three to five years in the penitentiary. One co-defend-
ant was sentenced to a jail term of from eighteen months to two years,
and the co-defendant for whom the plea of guilty had been entered was
given a six months' suspended sentence. Petitioner filed a petition for writ
of certiorari in the Superior Court of Cumberland County. The petition
was treated as an application for relief under the North Carolina Post-
Conviction Hearing Act.2 At the hearing, the evidence presented and a
transcript of the trial proceedings were considered. The court found
that no special circumstances were shown to indicate that the failure to
appoint trial counsel denied petitioner due process of law. Petitioner
then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. The Supreme Court of North Carolina dismissed the petition
without opinion. The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari and reversed the trial court judgment. Hudson v. North Caro-
lina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960).
In Betts v. Brady,3 the Court established the standards for determining
whether the denial of counsel to an indigent defendant in a non-capital
case is a denial of due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.4 The Court stated:
1 Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697, 698 (1960).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. ch. 15, art. 22 S§ 15-217-15-222 (Supp. 1959).
3 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 4 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, S 1.
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The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate,
as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment, although a
denial by a State of rights or privileges specifically embodied in that and others
of the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection
with other elements, operate, in a given, case, to deprive a litigant of due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.5
Since that decision the Court has set forth in its opinions various cir-
cumstances and elements which may determine whether there has been a
denial of due process of law in state criminal proceedings.,
The age, education, and knowledge of legal proceedings possessed by
the defendant are some of the criteria considered by the Court in de-
termining whether an indigent defendant who has not had the benefit of
trial counsel has been denied due process of law.7 In De Meerleer v.
Michigan,8 the Court found that a seventeen year old who was unfamiliar
with trial proceedings was denied due process of law when, without the
benefit of counsel, he was arraigned, convicted and sentenced to life im-
prisonment on the same day. Likewise, in Moore v. Michigan,9 the Court
determined that a seventeen year old with a seventh grade education
could not be deemed to have intelligently and to have understandingly
waived his right to counsel, and therefore, his lack of legal assistance de-
prived him of due process. However, youthfulness and lack of formal
education are not construed to be the conclusive criteria by which it can
be decided that the defendant requires legal assistance at his trial. In Wade
v. Mayo,10 the Court held that it is the responsibility of the trial court,
based upon personal observation of the defendant, to determine whether
petitioner is capable of representing himself. Further, in Gibbs v. Burke"
the Court ruled that the trial judge is to determine whether the accused
requires counsel at arraignment and during trial.
Still other criteria by which it can be shown that defendant is denied
5 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461 (1942).
6Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959);
Moore v. Michigan, 335 U.S. 155 (1957); Pennsylvania v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956);
Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); Quicksall
v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Gryger v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334
U.S. 672 (1948); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S.
134 (1947); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Canizio v. New York, 327
U.S. 82 (1946); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
7 Canizio v. New York, supra note 6; De Meerleer v. Michigan, supra note 6; Wade v.
Mayo, supra note 6; Uveges v. Pennsylvania supra note 6; Pennsylvania v. Claudy,
supra note 6; Moore v. Michigan, supra note 6.
8 329 U.S. 663 (1947). 10 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
9 335 U.S. 155 (1957). 11 337 U.S. 773 (1949).
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due process of law by not having the assistance of counsel are the com-
plexity of the charge brought against defendant and the legal intricacy
of the possible defenses thereto. 12 Although defendant may be a person
of maturity and intelligence and have experience in criminal proceedings,
there may still be a denial of due process if there is lack of counsel where
the charge is too complex or a skilled knowledge is needed to effectively
defend the case. This test has been enumerated by the Court in several
cases since 1942.13
A third concept employed by the Court in holding the denial of due
process is by means of examination by the Court itself of the trial court's
conduct and/or the prosecuting officials' behavior. This was specifically
stated in Townsend v. Burke1 4 where the Court held that defendant was
denied due process of law when the lack of counsel resulted in the de-
fendant being prejudiced by the state's unwarranted conduct. Likewise,
in the Gibbs case where considerable hearsay evidence and incompetent
evidence was admitted, and a witness for the prosecution was recalled as a
defense witness to the detriment of defendant, the Court stated:
The questionable issues allowed to pass unnoticed as to procedure, evidence,
privilege, and instructions detailed in the first part of this opinion demonstrate
to us that petitioner did not have a trial that measures up to the test of fairness
prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 5
In Palmer v. Ashe,' 6 defendant was allegedly told that he was being in-
dicted for breaking and entering when in reality the indictment was
for armed robbery. In reversing and remanding this case, the Court ruled
that if defendant could prove such charges, he had been the victim of
deception by officers and as a result had been denied due process of law.
In applying the above enumerated tests, the Court has stated that in
non-capital cases wherein an indigent defendant has not received the
benefit of counsel, a determination of whether the defendant has received
a fair trial as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment must be made by
considering all facts involved in the case.1 7 In Uveges v. Pennsylvania's
12 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
13 Pennsylvania v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949);
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663
(1947).
14 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
15 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 782 (1949).
16 342 U.S. 134 (1951).
l7 Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949);
Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
18 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
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the Court found that the trial court had made no attempt to advise de-
fendant of the consequences of his plea when he pleaded guilty to four
indictments carrying a maximum sentence of eighty years. Similarly, in
Moore v. Michigan,' the Court found the facts indicated a basic unfair-
ness when a seventeen year old Negro waived his right to counsel be-
cause he feared the threat of mob violence and thus wanted to be re-
moved from his place of custody as soon as possible.20 Again, in Penn-
sylvania v. Claudy,2' it was held that due process of law was denied de-
fendant, a twenty-one year old of limited education, because he had
pleaded guilty to numerous charges of burglary, larceny, forgery and
false pretenses without advice of counsel. The Court felt that no layman
could have understood the accusations. But in Foster v. Illinois,22 al-
though it appeared in the record that defendant had pleaded guilty and
did not have the aid of counsel, the Court did not feel that defendant
had been denied due process of law in light of the other circumstances
in the case. And in Bute v. Illinois23 the Court found that the indictment
was drawn in simple language, the consequences of a guilty plea were
explained and the defendant was capable of intelligently pleading guilty
to the charge without an attorney to advise him. In Gryger v. Burke,2 4
defendant alleged deprivation of due process since he was not advised of
his right to counsel. Denying, as in the latter two cases, that. there was a
deprivation, the Court stated: "It rather overstrains our credulity to be-
lieve that one who had been a defendant eight times and for whom coun-
sel had twice waged defenses, albeit unsuccessful ones,, did not know of
his right to counsel. '25 The test, then, in determining whether an in-
digent defendant has been denied due process of law through lack of
counsel is an examination of all the facts in the case to find whether
special circumstances exist that indicate a basic unfairness of trial that
results in a violation of the guarantees contained in the fourteenth
amendment.
In examining the decision in Hudson v. North Carolina2 6 in light of
the above, it can be seen that the Court considered the various categories
of special circumstances enumerated since the Betts case. In referring to
the age, education, and familiarity of defendant with trial proceedings,
the Court found that a determination was made in the post-conviction
hearing that petitioner, although only eighteen years old and possessing
only a sixth grade education, was "[I]ntelligent, well-informed, and
was familiar with and experienced in Court procedure and criminal
19 335 U.S. 155 (1957). 23 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
2 0 1 d. at 162. 24 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
21350 US. 116 (1956). 25 Id. at 730.
22 332 US. 134 (1947). 26 363 U.S. 697 (1960).
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trials .... -2 The Supreme Court sustained this finding on the basis of
their holding in Wade v. Mayo, 28 wherein they state that such a finding
is the peculiar province of the lower court. The Court further found
that the detailed findings of the post-conviction hearing showed that the
trial judge had not acted in an overreaching manner and "advised the
petitioner of his right to challenge when the jury was selected and ad-
vised the petitioner of his right to cross examine witnesses and to argue
the case to the jury"; 29 that "during the trial the Court properly excluded
evidence which was inadmissible, and the petitioner cross examined the
witnesses against him and at his request testified in his own behalf." 30
After holding that the first two tests were inapplicable, the Court found
from an examination of the record that during the trial petitioner had
been put in a position that required professional knowledge and experi-
ence beyond his scope.31 This decision was based on the plea of guilty to
petit larceny by petitioner's co-defendant. The Court stated that the
potential prejudice that resulted to petitioner from this plea and the sub-
sequent failure of the trial judge to inform the jury that the co-defend-
ant's plea was not to be considered in determining petitioner's guilt,
worked a denial of due process.3 2 The Hudson case, then, as decided by
the Court, was placed in the category where the defense to the charge
against petitioner is so intricate as to require professional knowledge, and
where- to deny petitioner counsel operates to cause a constitutionally
unfair trial.
As mentioned previously, an examination of all facts involved in the
case is made to determine whether special circumstances exist that op-
erate to deprive petitioner of due process of law. The dissent of Justices
Clark and Whittaker to this decision sheds light on the record that was
used in the Hudson case. In questioning the prejudicial quality of the
plea to the jury, the dissent points out that although petitioner, from the
trial court proceeding forward, had been represented by counsel in each
hearing, the co-defendant's plea to the jury had never been raised by
either side of the controversy as being prejudicial to petitioner."3 In addi-
tion, petitioner's counsel before this Court only mentioned the plea to
the jury but did not argue that this was prejudicial to petitioner. Fur-
ther, in discussing whether the plea to the jury was of such a prejudicial
[E]ven the North Carolina cases 4 cited by the Court do not support...
27 1d. at 701.
29 334 U.S. 672 (1948). 31 Id. at 704.
29 Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. at 700. 32 Id. at 703.
:30 Id. at 701. 33 Id. at 704.
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nature as to cause a basic unfairness of trial, the dissent stated: ".
reversal. All they indicate, as the Court frankly points out, is that care
must be exercised to avoid 'undue prejudice.' -5 Dwelling further upon
the co-defendant's plea to the jury, Justices Clark and Whittaker point
out that although the trial court's instruction to the jury indicated the
presence of violence, intimidation and putting the victim in fear, the
jury did not find petitioner guilty of the common-law offense of robbery
but found him guilty of a lesser offense.36 As stated by the dissent: "As I
apraise the jury's verdict, it would be much more realistic to say that
[co-defendant's] plea of guilty influenced the jury not to find petitioner
guilty of the greater offense." '37
The facts in the Hudson case seem to indicate that there is little to sup-
port the view that the denial of counsel to petitioner operated to cause a
basic unfairness of trial. This seems particularly true in light of the fact
that the Court based its decision solely upon the potential prejudice that
might have accrued against petitioner as a result of his co-defendant's plea
to the jury. However, in rendering their decision in the Hudson case, the
Supreme Court cites their holding in Spano v. New York3s wherein it
stated; "Because of the delicate nature of the constitutional determination
which we must make, we cannot escape the responsibility of making our
own examination of the record."89 The decision in the Hudson case ap-
pears to point out what the Court considers to be its responsibility and
may be the harbinger of a relaxation of the "special circumstances" test.
34 State v. Kerley, 246 N.C. 157, 97 S.E.2d 876 (1957); State v. Bryant, 236 N.C. 745,
73 S.E.2d 791 (1953); State v. Hunter, 94 N.C. 829 (1886).
35 Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 705, 706 (1960).
3 6 Id. at 705. 38 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
37 Ibid. 39 Id. at 316. (Emphasis added.)
CONTRACTS-ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
HELD ENFORCEABLE
The plaintiff, doing business as A-I Plumbing Supply Co., entered into
a contract with the defendant union. The contract provided, in essence,
that if the parties could not agree voluntarily to extend an agreement as
to hours, wages, working conditions, or any other contingency that
might arise, the dispute would be submitted to an arbitration board com-
posed of representatives formerly agreed upon. A dispute did arise and
the defendant, without first presenting its grievance to the arbitration
board, called a strike. The plaintiff brought action for damages for breach
of contract, but the defendant contended that the arbitration agreement
